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NOTES
REDUCING CIVIL DISABILITIES FOR
CONVICTED FELONS IN NORTH DAKOTA:
A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION*
I. INTRODUCTION'
In North Dakota, the civil rights of a convict are suspended dur-
ing his term of imprisonment2 and can be restored only by ap-
plication to the North Dakota Board of PardonsA In some cases it
is questionable if the inmates' civil rights are ever restored.4 This
state law is called a civil death statute. Thirteen other states have
civil death statutes similar to that of North Dakota.5 Although the
remaining states have repealed their civil death statutes or have
never had such legislation, specific civil disabilities still affect the
convicts. These disabilities include loss of the right to vote, loss of
the right to hold public office, loss of the right to act as a juror,
and loss or denial of professional and occupational licenses.6
North Dakota's statute is clear on certain points. Upon "impri-
sonment in the penitentiary" a citizen will forfeit his basic civil
rights. But unlike other civil death jurisdictions, North Dakota has
0 This note is based on a report the authors wrote under a grant from the North Dakota
Law Enforcement Council for the Institute for the Study of Crime and Delinquency, Bureau
of Governmental Affairs, University of North Dakota.
1. The scope of a major portion of this paper will include a discussion of the prevailing
North Dakota civil disability statute, and how this statute in relationship with the entire
North Dakota Century Code and body of North Dakota case law affects the rights of Im-
prisoned individuals during their Incarceration and after their parole or discharge. It
should be noted at the outset that the 1973 North Dakota Legislature passed a new statute
which effectively repeals the present civil disability statute. The new legislation will not
become effective until the Act of July 1, 1975, ch. 116, [1973] N.D. Laws, 43rd Sess.
2. N.D. CENr. ConE § 12-06-27 (1960), which states:
A sentence of imprisonment in the penitentiary for any term less than for life
suspends all the civil rights of the person sentenced and forfeits all public of-
fices and all private trusts, authority, or power during the term of such im-
prisonment. A person sentenced to imprisonment for life Is deemed civilly dead.
Any person serving a term in the penitentiary shall be capable of making and
acknowledging a sale or conveyance of property and can maintain any action
based on natural rights. He may be sued and in such case may defend.
3. See notes 300-19, infra.
4. See notes 297-819, infra and accompanying text.
5. Comment, Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Con iction, 8 VArD. L. REv. 929.
950 (1970).
6. See, e.g., IX.. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 100&5-5 (1973),
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included vague wording in its statute that states "an imprisoned in-
dividual can maintain any action based on 'natural rights'."
The original North Dakota civil disability statute was codified in
1895. It stated: "A sentence of imprisonment in the penitentiary for
any term less than life, suspends all civil rights of the person so
sentenced, and forfeits all public and private trusts, authority or
power, during the term of imprisonment." 7 In 1943 the statute was
re-written to combine sections 7707 and 7708 into an amended sec-
tion numbered 12-0627. A reviser's note stated that the sections were
joined because they contained similar subject matter. The "natural
rights" concept was added following the decision handed down by
the Supreme Court of North Dakota in Miller v. Turner." Since the
introduction of the concept of "natural rights" no attempt has been
made by either the legislature or the courts to clarify its meaning.
Historically the term "natural rights" has been difficult to de-
fine. "Natural rights" were considered a basis for law during the
Roman Era, and there was a strong sentiment among early Amer-
ican legal scholars that "natural rights" were incorporated into the
early laws of the United States. Very few sources could be found
that attempted to specifically categorize the "natural rights" of man.
An example of this vagueness can be found in one early American
legal work that stated: "In spite of these interesting observations,
it is manifestly difficult to point to any conspicuous modern repre-
sentation of a clearly defined doctrine of natural law."9 Despite
the failure of other jurisdictions to clarify this term, North Dakota
enumerated certain "natural rights" within its original constitution."
7. R.C. §§ 7706-08 (1895).
8. Miller v. Turner, 64 N.D. 463, 258 N.W. 437 (1934); N.D. CENT. CoDm § 12-06-27
(1960). The deviser's note stated:
Sections Joined to connect similar subject matter. The last portion of this section
"and can maintain any action . . ." has been added following the decision handed
down by the Supreme Court in the case of Miller v. Turner, 64 N.D. 463. 253
N.W. 437, in which the court held that while a convict cannot make contracts
generally under this section he can make such contracts as are necessary for
the disposition of his property only. He has no authority to make any other kind
of a contract and cannot maintain any action except those which concern his
personal liberty and are based on natural rights as distinguished from legal
rights. He may be sued and in such case he can defend.
9. Spencer, The Revival of Natural Law, 80 CEWr. L.J. 346 (1915).
10. See N.D. CONST. art. III, § (1) (1889).
(1). Natural Rights.
Section 1. All men are born equally free and independent, and have certaln
inherent, inalienable and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying
and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing protecting property and
reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.
Section 2. All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Al-,
mighty God according to the dictates of their owfi consciences, and no person
shall be denied any civil or political right, privilege or capacity on account of
his religious opinions. No man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or
support any place of worship or to maintain any minister of religion against his
consent. No preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishment
or mode of worship; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be
construed to dispense with oaths or affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness
NOTES
Although the subheading "natural rights" has been dropped from the
text of the constitution and the contents of this subheading have
been realigned, each section is retained in the Declaration of Rights.
If a convict can protect his "natural rights" and if we assume that
every man's "natural rights" can categorically be found in the orig-
inal text of the North Dakota Constitution, this concept could be used
to extend prisoners' rights and to challenge the constitutionality of
the statute.
II. CIVIL DISABILITIES-ARE THEY CONSTITUTIONAL?
Although there have been a few cases which have ruled that the
application of a certain civil disability law is unconstitutional, no
court has ruled that the concept of civil disabilities is unconstitu-
tional per se.11
A. CIVIL DISABILITY LAWS AS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS
Due Process of law is not susceptible to a definition that is ap-
plicable to all situations.12 Its meaning will vary with the general
rules of fair play that govern society.13 Due process has been de-
fined as the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which are
the basis of our civil and political institutions.1 4 As applied to sub-
stantive rights, due process requires that the government cannot de-
prive a person of life, liberty or property by an act which does
not have a reasonable relation to a valid governmental purpose.1 5
or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state.
Section 3. No title of nobility or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor or
emolument shall ever be granted or conferred in this state.
Section 4. Emigration from the state shall not be prohibited.
Section 5. Aliens who are bona fide residents of this state shall have the
rights of citizens with regard to the acquisition, possession, transfer and descent
of property.
Section 6. Every man shall have the right freely to write, speak and pub-
lish his opinions on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.
In all civil and criminal trials for libel, the truth may be given in evidence,
and shall be a sufficient defense when the matter is published with good mo-
tives and for justifiable ends; and the jury shall have the same power of giving
a general verdict as in other cases.
Section 7. All political power Is inherent in the people, and they have the
right to alter, reform or abolish their form of government whenever the public
good may require it.
11. In Stephens v. Yeomans,- 327 F. Supp. 1182 (D.N.J. 1970), the District Court for the
District of New Jersey held unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection a disenfran-
chisement statute which excluded from the franchise ex-criminals who had committed cer-
tain crimes. The court overturned the statute because of the haphazard treatment it af-
forded to different criminals. "Most defrauders, including persons convicted of income tax
fraud, remain eligible to vote . . . but those convicted of larceny are ineligible." rd. at 1188.
But see Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117 (M.D.N.C. 1972).
12. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 240, 442 (1960). See 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 567
(1956).
13. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
14. See Rochin v. People of Cal., 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
15. Zemel v. Rusk, 881 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1964). See 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 567
(1956). Procedural due process requires that a person be given an opportunity to be heard
In order to protect his rights. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 1U.S, 35A (1970).
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Civil disability laws create a conclusive presumption that a fel-
on is unfit to perform certain activities. This conclusive presump-
tion of unfitness is generally not questioned by the Courts.16 In
Hawker v. New York,' 7 the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality
of a New York statute which forbade convicted felons from prac-
ticing medicine. Mr. Hawker had been convicted of performing an
abortion before the statute was passed. The court held that the state
may use the prior conviction as conclusive evidence of an absence
of the good character required of a physician,' stating that a con-
victed felon conclusively lacks good moral character because of a
prior conviction deprives the ex-felon of an opportunity to provide
evidence of his good moral character. In Heiner v. Donnan, 9 the
plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a statute which said that
any transfer of property made within two years of the decedent's
death was a transfer in contemplation of death. The Supreme Court
of the United States held that the statute violated due process be-
cause this statute created a conclusive presumption which did not
allow the heirs to prove the transfer was not made in contemplation
of death.2 0 The ruling in Heiner could arguably be applied to civil
disability laws since civil disability laws create a conclusive pre-
sumption of unfitness which cannot be refuted by the ex-felon.
Civil disability laws have been challenged as violating due pro-
cess because of the lack of a rational connection between the de-
privation suffered the ex-felon and the government's purpose under-
lying the disability statutes.2 1 The rationale is that the inclusion of
all ex-felons in civil disability statutes is overbroad in regard to the
interests which the state is trying to protect.
22
In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,23 the Supreme Court
of the United States ruled that the Board of Bar Examiners of New
Mexico violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by denying the plaintiff a license to practice law in the state
of New Mexico. After graduating from the University of New Mex-
ico Law School in 1953, the plaintiff applied to take the bar exami-
nation. The plaintiff's application was denied because of information
given to the Board of Bar Examiners by the plaintiff that he had
used aliases, been connected with the Communist Party, and had
been arrested several times prior to 1940. The Board said that the
16. Comment, supra note 5, at 1199.
17. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1889).
18. Id. at 191.
19. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
20. Id. at 328.
21. See, e.g., Devau v. Braistad, 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
22. Comment, supra note 5, at 1207. See Comment, Employment of Former Criminals, 55
CORNELL L. REV. 306 (1970). The state's interest is to protect the public from corruption in
certain areas.
23. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). See Comment, Civil Dis-
abilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. REa. 403, 416 (1967).
NOTES
plaintiff lacked the requisite moral character for admission to the
bar of New Mexico. In reversing the decision of the Supreme Court
of New Mexico, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a
state cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or any other
occupation in a manner or for reasons which contravene the Due
Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
24
A state can require high standards such as good moral character be-
fore admission to the bar, but the qualifications must bear a rational
connection to the applicant's fitness to practice law.52 The Court
reasoned that since none of the alleged violations of good moral char-
acter occurred within the last fifteen years, the denial of the plain-
tiff's application for admission to the bar was a violation of due
process in light of the evidence he introduced at the hearing.
A similar result occurred in Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Ex-
aminers.20 The Supreme Court of California ruled that plaintiff's
misdemeanor convictions in connection with peaceful civil rights
demonstrations and his belief that he had a duty to disobey uncon-
stitutional laws did not warrant his exclusion from the bar of Cali-
fornia. The court in Hallinan quoted Schware saying:
A state can require high standards of qualification, such
as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it
admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must
have a rational connection with the applicants' fitness or ca-
pacity to practice law.27 Obviously an applicant would not
be excluded merely because he was a Republican or a Negro
or a member of a particular church. Even in applying per-
missible standards, officers of a state cannot exclude an ap-
plicant when there is no basis for their finding that he fails
to meet these standards, or when their action is indiviously
discriminating.
28
Despite the standards which emerged from Schware and Halli-
nan courts have almost unanimously upheld civil disability statutes
as rational regulations enacted to protect legitimate public interests. 29
In Deveau v. Braistad,30 the Supreme Court of the United States
upheld a disability law which forbade the collection of dues by a
labor organization if any officer or agent of the labor organization
had ever been convicted of a felony, unless the officer or agent had
been pardoned. In 1920, appellant, who was secretary-treasurer of
24. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238, 239 (1957).
25. Id. at 239.
26. Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr.
228 (1966).
27. Emphasis added.
28. Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 457, 421 P.2d 76, 86, 55
Cal. Rptr. 228, 238 (1966).
29. Comment, supra note 5, at 1203. See, e.g., Upshaw v. McNamara, 435 F.2d 1188 (1st
Cir. 1970).
80. Deveau v. Braistad, 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
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Local 1346, International Longshoremen's Association, plead guilty
to a charge of grand larceny and received a suspended sentence. 1
In denying appellant's claim that enforcement of the Act denied due
process, the Court looked to the legislative history behind the Act
and determined that barring convicted felons from waterfront union
offices was a reasonable means for achieving a legitimate state aim,
namely to rid the waterfront from corruption. This Act was reason-
able in light of state3 2 and Congressional studies which indicated
that ex-convicts on the waterfront were a principal cause of corrup-
tion.33 The Court said that even though it was cognizant of the
promising record of rehabilitation of ex-felons, it would not substi-
tute its judgment for that of the states and the United States Con-
gress .
4
Although the Schware and Hallinan decisions seem to limit the
right of states to deny admission to the bar because of arbitrary
decisions on what constitutes good moral character, it must be re-
membered that neither Schware nor Hallinan was convicted of a
felony. Thus the Schware and Hallinan decisions cannot be used as
precedents to overturn civil disability statutes which disqualify fel-
ons from certain professions.35
B. CIL DISABILrTY LAWS AS A VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
hibits any state from denying equal protection of its laws to any
citizen. The standard used to determine whether equal protection has
been violated varies according to the interest which is affected by
the particular classification. Traditionally equal protection is vio-
lated "only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to
the achievement of the State's objective."386 This requirement of a
rational basis between the classification and the achievement of the
state's objective is supplanted by a more stringent test if the clas-
sification is "suspect" 7 or if the classification affects a fundamen-
tal interest.3 8 In such cases the state is required to show a "com-
pelling" state interest before the classification will survive an equal
protection challenge.8 9
31. Id. at 145-46.
32. The New York Waterfront Commission Act was created by the states of New York
and New Jersey to try to solve some of the evils which existed on their joint waterfront in
the Port of New York. Id. at 147.
33. Id. at 157, 158.
34. Id. at 158.
35. But see Muhammad Ali v. Division of State Athletic Comm'n., N.Y., 316 F. Supp. 1246
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
36. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
37. Comment, Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. RTV. 1065, 1088 (1969). Classifications which
are "suspect" include those based on race, lineage and alienage.
38. Id. at 1127-28. Fundamental interests Include voting, procreation, rights with respect
to criminal procedure, and to a lesser degree education.
89. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1968).
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If courts use a traditional standard of review, an ex-felon will
have to show that his exclusion from certain occupations and pro-
fessions is not reasonable in light of the interest the state is trying
to protect. This will place an extremely heavy burden on the ex-
felon in light of the reluctance of courts to overturn occupational
disabilities for ex-felons.4 0 In Mones v. Austin,41 the plaintiff pre-
sented an equal protection challenge to a statute that excluded him
from the race tracks of Florida because of a prior bookmaking con-
viction. Although not all ex-felons were excluded from the race
tracks of Florida, the court held that the exclusion was neither ar-
bitrary not unreasonable in light of the connection between book-
making and illegal gambling.42 A similar result occurred in Upshaw
v. McNamara,'43 where an ex-felon sought to receive a police ap-
pointment. The ex-felon, who had received a full pardon, challenged
the police commissioner's automatic refusal to appoint a pardoned
felon to the police force as a denial of equal protection.44 After
deciding that a classification based on a criminal record is not a
"suspect" classification,' 5 the court went on to find a rational basis
for the policy of not hiring ex-felons even if they had been par-
doned.46 The rational basis for the exclusion was that "a person who
has committed a felony may be thought to lack the qualities of self-
control or honesty that this sensitive job requires.' 
7
In Green v. Board of Elections of the City of New York, 4 an
ex-felon's challenge to disenfranchisement on equal protection
grounds was denied. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of
a New York statute which provided that no person convicted of a
felony shall register or vote unless he has bean pardoned or restor-
ed to the rights of citizenship by the President of the United States.
In denying plaintiff's equal protection challenge, the court said that
previous landmark voting rights cases did not preclude the states
from disenfranchising "persons convicted of all or certain types of
felonies.' " By saying that "it can scarcely be deemed unreasonable
for a state to decide that perpetrators of serious crimes shall not
take part in electing the legislators who make the laws, the execu-
40. See Deveau v. Braistad, 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
41. Mones v. Austin, 318 F. Supp. 653, 654 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
42. Id. at 657.
43. Upshaw v. McNamara, 435 F.2d 1188, 1189 (1st Cir. 1970).




48. Green v. Board of Elections of the City of New York, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir, 1967). In
Green, the plaintiff had been convicted of two felonies (conspiracy to violateO the Smith Act
and criminal contempt for failure to surrender after his conviction. See Fincher v. Scott,
352 F. Supp. 117 (M.D.N.C. 1972). But see, Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182 (D.N.J.
1970). See also DuFresne, The Case for Allowing "Convicted Mafiosi to Vote for Judges":
Beyond Green v. Board of Elections of New York City, 19 DEPAUL L. REv. 112 (1969).
49. Id. at 451.
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tors who enforce them, the prosecutors who must try them for fur-
ther violations, or the judges who are to consider their cases," 50 the
court justified the exclusion of ex-felons from the franchise by using
a rational basis test. Since voting is a fundamental right, the court
should have applied the more rigid standard, of a "compelling" state
interest.
In Otsuka v. Hite,51 the Supreme Court of California held that
a conscientious objector should be placed on the voting role since
his crime was not "infamous." The California Constitution prohibits
persons convicted of "infamous" crimes from exercising the fran-
chise. By excluding the plaintiff's crime from "infamous" crimes the
court upheld the statute denying the franchise to those persons con-
victed of "infamous" crimes. Although Otsuka limited the meaning
of "infamous" crimes, it did not overturn a disenfranchisement stat-
ute on equal protection grounds.
Equal protection challenges to civil disability laws which deny
licenses to convicted felons may be successful if the individual can
prove that licenses have been issued to other offenders with crimi-
nal convictions. In Muhammad Ali v. Division of State Athletic
Com'n, N. Y.,52 the plaintiff challenged the denial of a license to
box in the state of New York.5 3 The court ruled that the denial of
the license to the plaintiff was an arbitrary denial of equal protec-
tion since other felons in similar circumstances had been granted
licenses to box. 4 This ruling indicates that if the ex-felon can estab-
lish that he has been denied a license while other ex-felons in simi-
lar situations have been granted licenses, he may be able to chal-
lenge the denial as a violation of equal protection.
C. CIVIL DISABILITIES AS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Claims that civil disability laws violate the Eighth Amendment
have been routinely dismissed by the courts. In Green v. Board of
Elections of the City of New York,5 5 the court found two rationales
for holding that the disenfranchisement of convicted felons is not
cruel and unusual punishment. First, the court stated that the de-
privation of the franchise is not a punishment but rather a "non-
penal exercise of the power to regulate the franchise." 56 Second, if
the deprivation of the franchise is a punishment then the framers of
50. Id.
51. Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966).
52. Muhammed Ali v. Division of State Athletic Comm'n., N.Y., 316 F. Supp. 1246
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
53. Id. at 1248.
54. Id. at 1253.
55. Green v. Board of Elections of the City of New York, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967).
56. Id. at 450. rop v. Dulles, 956 U.S. 86, 97 (1958). See Gough, The Expungements of
Adjudication. Records of Juvenile and Adult Offendeds: A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH.
U.L.Q. 147 (1966).
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the Bill of Rights would not consider this deprivation to be cruel
and unusual.
57
Arguably, civil disability laws are cruel and unusual punishment
because they punish an ex-felon for his status. In Robinson v. Cali-
Jornia, 58 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that a stat-
ute that punished an individual for being a narcotics addict was un-
constitutional as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 59 The
statute punished an individual for being an addict even though he
never touched a narcotic drug in the state or was guilty of any
irregular behavior.60 This punishment based on status could be anal-
ogous to an ex-felon who is subject to civil disabilities because of
his status as an ex-felon.
D. CML DISABILITY LAWS AS BILLS OF ATTAINDER
In State v. O'Brien,6 1 the Supreme Court of the United States
defined a bill of attainder and identified the requisite elements that
must be proven if a statute is to be classified as a bill of attainder.
The Court defined a bill of attainder "as a legislative Act which in-
flicts punishment on normal individuals or members of an easily
ascertainable group without a judicial trial.
' 6 2
In Deveau v. Braistad,63 the plaintiff attacked as a bill of at-
tainder a statute that prevented the collection of dues by any labor
organization if an officer or agent was an ex-felon.64 The Supreme
Court of the United States dismissed the argument saying that the
distinguishing feature of a bill of attainder is the substitution of a
legislative finding of guilt instead of a judicial determination. 5 The
court felt that the only implications of the defendant's guilt were
those contained in the 1920 trial.66 Also, the Court determined that
the restrictions on ex-felons in the statute were not a punishment
for past activity but were needed to regulate the present situation.
Such restrictions were held to be justifiable in light of the legiti-
mate legislative purpose of the statute.67
E. COMMENT
Constitutional challenges to civil disability laws have been denied
by almost all courts. As stated in the previous sections, most of the
successful constitutional challenges to civil disability laws have oc-
57. Green v. Board of Elections of the City of New York, 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967).
58. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
59. Id. at 667.
60. Id.
61. State v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
62. Id. at 383 n.30.
63. Deveau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
64. Id. at 145.
65. Id. at 160.
66. Id.
87. I.
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curred when the court has found that the individual does not come
within a particular classification; that the civil disability laws have
been applied arbitrarily and capriciously; or that the legislative pur-
pose in excluding ex-felons is unreasonable in light of a legitimate
state interest.
III. ACCESS TO THE COURTS FOR PRISONERS
Although, in theory, there are various ways for a prisoner to
seek redress of his grievances through the courts, the courts' ad-
herence to the "hands-off doctrine" has prevented any meaningful
redress.6 8 The "hands-off doctrine" is typified by Banning v. Looney69
in which the court dismissed a complaint from a federal prisoner
who claimed his constitutional rights were being violated. The court
ruled that "[C]ourts are without power to supervise prison admin-
istration or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules or regula-
tions."
70
The first group of cases to overturn the "hands-off doctrine"
were cases which concerned the right of access to the courts. 71 The
principle of access to federal courts was set out in Ex Parte Hull,7 2
when the Supreme Court of the United States held that "the state
and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply
to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. '73 Access to state
courts by state prisoners was subsequently recognized in White v.
Ragan.
7 4
When prisoners have attacked their convictions, cases have held
that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment forbid prison administrators from enforcing even
reasonable regulations which prevent a prisoner from filing a time-
ly appeal.7 5 The importance of access to the courts for prisoners
cannot be overemphasized; without access, a prisoner is left with
rights which are unenforceable.
In Stiltner v. Rhay,7 6 The Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed the principle that access to the courts is basic to all other
rights protected by the Civil Rights Act, for it is essential to their
68. See Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review
The Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L. REv. 506 (1963).
69. Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1054). cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954).
70. Id.
71. See Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEo. WASH. L. Rgv. 175,
183 (1970).
72. Exp arte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
73. Id. at 549.
74. White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 762 n.1 (1944).
75. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 71, at 231. In Dowd v. United States ex rel Cook, 340
U.S. 206 (1951) the Supreme Court of the United States held that a discriminatory denial
of a statutory right to appeal Is a denial of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
A mendment.
76. Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1963).
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enforcement. "77 Thus, courts have reaffirmed the necessity of rea-
sonable access when prisoners are challenging their original convic-
tion or claiming mistreatment by prison officials.
7 8
Courts have not been as concerned about the refusal by prison
officials to provide access to the courts for a civil suit if the civil
suit is not related to the prisoner's liberty.79 In Tabor v. Hardwick,8"
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the wisdom
of the rule in Hull and White which gives prisoners the "right to
inquire into the validity of their restraint of personal liberty and
freedom." '81 However, the court in Tabor stated that the right to
access principle was not "intended to give them [inmates] an ab-
solute and unrestricted right to file any civil action they might de-
sire."' 82 Courts which permit the filing of civil actions by prisoners
often toll the statute of limitations for the prisoner and then post-
pone the action until the prisoner is released from prison.83 If a state
has a civil death statute, the statute of limitations is usually tolled
during incarceration.8 4 By postponing the prisoner's civil action un-
til he is released, the court denies the prisoner the possibility of in-
junctive relief.8 5 If civil rights are suspended under a civil death
statute the right to sue is denied although the prisoner still has a
right to defend himself.88 This right to defend does not mean that
the prisoner has a right to be present at the civil suit. By forcing
a prisoner to wait until after his incarceration to prosecute a civil
suit, the prisoner is at a distinct disadvantage because witnesses
may no longer be around or the evidence may have gone stale.
7
A prisoner confined to a state penitentiary has six basic remedies
which he can use to challenge either his unlawful detention or his
treatment. The six remedies are: 1) habeas corpus; 2) the Federal
Civil Rights Act; 3) civil suits against federal, state, and local
governments and their administrative officials; 4) criminal actions
against prison officials; 5) class actions; and 6) post conviction re-
lief.
A. HABEAS CORPUS88
Prisoners have traditionally used habeas corpus as a means to
77. Id. at 316.
78. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 71, at 232.
79. Id.
80. Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1955).
81. Id. at 529.
82. Id.
83. Seybold v. Milwaukee County Sheriff, 276 F. Supp. 484, 487 (E.D. Wis. 1967).
84. RtUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTIoN 615 (1963).
85. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 71, at 232.
86. RUBIN, supra note 84, at 615.
87. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 71, at 232.
88. Habeas corpus is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as
Lat. (You have the body.) The name given to a variety of writs, ... having
for their object to bring a party before a court or judge. In common usage, and
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challenge the legality of their confinement.8 9 There are three tra-
ditional limitations on the prisoner's use of the writ of habeas corpus
that have reduced its effectiveness. The three limitations are: 1)
"the exhaustion of remedies rule; 2) the proposition that the only
relief which can be granted under the writ is total release; and,
3) the restriction that the writ is only available to contest the le-
gitimacy of one's confinement and is not available to test the legi-
timacy of the mode or manner of confinement." 90
Before 1944, federal and state courts would only hear habeas
corpus petitions if the prisoner challenged the legality of his orig-
inal conviction. In such cases the granting of the writ would lead
to a new trial or release.9 1 In 1944, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit expanded the previous limitations which had been plac-
ed on habeas corpus. In Coffin v. Reichard,9 2 the court stated:
Any unlawful restraint of personal liberty may be in-
quired into on habeas corpus. . . . A prisoner is entitled to
the writ of habeas corpus when, though lawfully in custody,
he is deprived of some right to which he is lawfully en-
titled even in his confinement. .... 93
The writ of habeas corpus was further expanded in Peyton v.
Rowe.94 In this case the Supreme Court of the United States held
that a prisoner serving consecutive sentences could prosecute a writ
of habeas corpus that claimed that the future sentence was invalid
because of a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In Johnson v. Avery s5 the petitioner was placed in disciplinary con-
finement because he continued to help other inmates prepare legal
papers. The Supreme Court of the United States granted petition-
er's writ of habeas corpus which freed the petitioner from disciplin-
ary confinement. The Supreme Court of the United States stated that
Tennessee could not enforce its regulation which prevented inmates
from helping other inmates prepare legal papers until the state of
Tennessee provided a reasonable alternative to the "jail house law-
yer." By refusing to allow inmates to help other inmates prepare
legal papers the state of Tennessee was denying illiterate prisoners
reasonable access to the courts.
The exhaustion of remedies limitation on habeas corpus requires
whenever these words are used alone, they are understood to mean the habeas
corpus ad subjicindum,-A writ directed to the person detaining another, and
commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner.
89. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 71, at 267. See Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus and State
Prisoners, 82 F.R.D. 88 (1963).
90. Comment, supra note 68, at 610.
91. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 71, at 267-68.
92. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1944).
93. Id. at 445.
94. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), overruling McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
95. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), aty'g 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
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a federal prisoner to exhaust the remedies of the Bureau of Prisons
before he is eligible for the writ.9 6 The exhaustion of remedies limi-
tation forces a state prisoner to exhaust his administrative and state
court remedies before he can apply to a federal court for a writ
of habeas corpus.9 7 In Fay v. Noia,99 the Supreme Court of the
United States ruled that "the jurisdiction of federal courts on habe-
as corpus is not affected by procedural defaults incurred by the ap-
plicant during the state court proceedings."9 9 This relaxation of the
exhaustion of remedies requirement for state prisoners was limit-
ed somewhat by the Courts grant to federal judges of limited dis-
cretion to deny relief when the petitioner has deliberately by-passed
state remedies.
The relaxation of the exhaustion of state remedies requirement
in Fay does not set a precedent to allow the use of habeas corpus
by state prisoners to attack prison restrictions and regulations with-
out first exhausting state remedies. 100 If a state does not have a
procedure for the consideration of violations of alleged federal con-
stitutional rights, the state prisoner is not required to go through
the motions of filing with the state court.1° 1 Furthermore, when a
state prisoner faces obstacles that make state remedies ineffective,
he is not required to exhaust these state remedies before he applies
for federal habeas corpus relief. 10 2 This rule was set out in Young
v. Ragen. 0 3 The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that if
the state does not have an adequate state remedy, the petitioner may
file a habeas corpus petition without exhausting state remedies. In
Johnson v. Avery'0 4 the Supreme Court of the United States held that
since the state of Tennessee did not provide adequate help to pri-
soners in preparing legal documents, the state could not prevent
inmates from helping other inmates prepare petitions for the writ
of habeas corpus. In the per curiam opinion of Houghton v. Shafer,10
the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the petitioner did
not have to exhaust state remedies if the attempt 'at exhaustion
would be futile. This opinion intimates that if prison officials develop
adequate administrative procedures for handling prisoners' griev-
ances, the prisoner will be required to exhaust the administrative
96. Comment, eupra note 68, at 510.
97. Id.
98. Fay v. Nola, 372 U.S. 891 (1963).
99. Id. at 438.
100. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 71, at 273.
101. Id. at 274.
102.. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Fed-
eral Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV.
793, 894 (1965).
103. Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1949).
104. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 438 (1969).
105. Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968).
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procedures before he will be allowed to proceed in federal court
under habeas corpus.
B. FEDERAL CML RIGHTS ACT
If state officers or employees are involved, a prisoner can seek
a redress of his grievances through the Federal Civil Rights Act
of 1871:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution or laws, shall be liable to the party in-
jured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.106
Because of the "hands-off" doctrine, courts were hesitant to get
involved in what the courts deemed to be administrative problems. 10 7
The adherence to the "hands-off" doctrine prevented prisoners from
effectively invoking the Civil Rights Act. 108 New life was breathed in-
to the Civil Rights Act by the decision in Monroe v. Pape.09 In
Monroe, the petitioners, a husband and wife and their children, al-
leged that conduct of the officers of the city of Chicago who search-
ed their home without a warrant, and arrested and detained the
husband without a warrant, or arraignment, constituted a depriva-
tion of their "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 1983." Justice Douglas,
speaking for the Court, said:
It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced
would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to
the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and
refused before the federal one is invoked. Hence the fact
that Illinois by its constitution and laws outlaws searches and
seizures is not barrier to the present suit in the federal
court.
110
Thus, if a prisoner can show a cause of action by virtue of a vio-
lation of the Civil Rights Act, he need not exhaust state remedies
before he pursues his action in a federal court. In Cooper v. Pate,"'
the principle enunciated in Monroe was held applicable to prison-
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Since the Civil Rights Act Is limited to violations carried
out "under color of state law" the Act is not available to federal prisoners for use against
federal officials.
107. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 71, at 253.
108. Id.
109. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
110. Id. at 183.
111. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
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ers. In many federal courts, the Monroe decision ended the "hands-
off" doctrine in reference to state prisoner actions under the Civil
Rights Act.
112
To state a claim under the Civil Rights Act, the prisoner must
allege that the state: 1) "deprived him of a federal statutory right;
or 2) a constitutional right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 113 Besides the requirement that the action must have result-
ed in a deprivation of a federal statutory right or a constitutional
right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the petitioner must
show that the deprivation was "under color of state law." "Under
color of state law" is described as follows:
Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with authority
of state law, is action taken "under color of" state law.""
The definition of "under color of state law" was extended to private
persons acting jointly with state officials."15 Thus anyone given
authority in a correctional institution or working with persons who
have authority is within the ambit of the "under color of state
law" provision. Such individuals will be subject to suit pursuant to
the Civil Rights Act for any deprivation of a prisoner's federal
statutory right or a constitutional right guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment. 1 6
Although the Civil Rights Act provides for both legal and equit-
able remedies, it is uncommon to see an award of damages for a
violation of the Act. In Sostre v. McGinnis,1 7 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit allowed an award of compensatory damages
.to stand against a warden who placed Sostre in punitive segrega-
tion which deprived the prisoner of access to the courts. The ap-
pellate court reversed the awarding of punitive damages and dis-
missed the damages against the commissioner of corrections. The
liability imposed under a Civil Rights Act violation is entirely per-
sonal; it must be satisfied by the individual. The doctrine of
sovereign immunity prevents any part of the award from being paid
out of the state treasury without the state's consent."
8
After the revival of the Civil Rights Act in Monroe, federal
112. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 71, at 254; see Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th
Cir. 1968).
113. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 71, at 254 (Deprivation of a Federal Statutory Right).
See Smart v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967). (Deprivation of a constitutional right
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.) See Benton v. Maryland, 394 U.S. 784 (1969).
114. United States v. Classic, 813 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
115. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
116. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 71, at 256.
117. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, Oswald v. Sostre, 405
U.S. 978 (1972).
118. Id. at 205.
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courts have made equitable relief available for violations of pri-
soners' rights when the states have failed to develop adequate ad-
ministrative or judicial procedures.'" Although Monroe explicitly
stated that exhaustion of state remedies is not required before a
federal action is brought under the Civil Rights Act, a question has
been raised concerning whether state remedies must be *exhausted
in both legal and equitable actions for relief.120 This confusion re-
sults somewhat from the decision in Houghton v. Shafer, 21 where a
state prisoner sought injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Act for
the return of his law materials. 2 2 The Supreme Court of the United
States in a per curiarn decision reiterated the ruling in Monroe that
exhaustion of state remedies is not necessary under the Civil Rights
Act but added that in this case the exhaustion of state remedies
would be futile. 12 3 By indicating that exhaustion of state remedies
would be futile, the court seems to be saying that exhaustion of
state remedies may be required when equitable relief is sought
and the attempt at exhaustion would not be futile.
The question of whether exhaustion of state remedies is required
for injunctive relief is further compounded by the maxim that federal
courts will not entertain a suit in equity when there is adequate
relief at law.1 24 In Miller v. Purtell,125 the court quoted Monroe
saying that exhaustion of state remedies is not necessary for a
cause of action under the Civil Rights Act. However, the court
denied the prisoner's motion for injunctive relief because the prison-
er failed to show that there was no adequate remedy at law.12 6 Since
the prisoner had not shown the court that he had made an effort
to exhaust state remedies his motion for leave to file a complaint
in forma pauperis was denied.1
27
Under the Civil Rights Act a state prisoner can also seek
declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act. 2 8 Declara-
tory judgments define the rights and obligations of each party in a
particular case. 129 In Holt v. Sarver,30 the Federal District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted declaratory relief
under the Civil Rights Act to inmates of the Arkansas penitentiary
system because their constitutional rights had been violated. The
court granted declaratory relief stating that confinement in the
Arkansas penitentiary system constituted cruel and unusual punish-
119. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 71, at 258.
120. Id. at 260.
121. Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 640.
124. Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 524 (2d Cir. 1967).
125. Miller v. Purtell, 289 F. Supp. 733, 734 (E.D.Wis. 1968).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964).
129. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 71, at 262-63.
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ment. The court also declared that racial discrimination in the
prison violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'18 Usually declaratory relief is granted under the Civil
Rights Act only when a state fails to respond to a mandate by
the court to improve various conditions and practices in a prison.
182
C. CIVIL SUITs AGAINST FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS
A tort suit for damages is the most widely accepted method of
recovering for injuries due to the negligence of prison employees. 188
Many cases deal with a failure on the part of prison officials to
provide minimal necessities such as food, clothing, shelter, and
medical care.184
The biggest limitation on civil suits by prisoners is the current
requirement, in North Dakota "8 5 and many other states, that the
suit must be postponed until the prisoner is released from prison.
The suspension of the prisoner's civil rights during imprisonment
prevents him from suing a civil action although he has the right
to defend if he is sued. 86 Although most states toll the statute of
limitations during the time of imprisonment, the practical problems
of producing evidence and getting witnesses to testify many years
after the alleged incident when the petitioner is released make the
viability of civil suits questionable when the inmate's right to sue
is suspended.
Because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, federal and
'state governments are not liable for injuries caused by employees
who are working within the scope of their employment.8 7 The only
way to get around sovereign immunity is for the state to waive
its immunity either by statute or judicial decision. The Federal
Government, the District of Columbia, and over one-third of the
states have waived sovereign immunity in limited situations. "8 North
Dakota is not among the states which have waived sovereign immun-
ity. Under present North Dakota law a civil suit based on tortious
conduct of a prison employee could only be instituted by the prisoner
after his release. Since North Dakota still recognizes sovereign im-
munity, the suit would be against the persons involved, not against
the state.
130. See generally Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.Ark. 1970).
131. Id. at 382.
132. See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.Ark. 1970).
133. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 71, at 244.
134. Id.
135. N.D. CENT. COD § 28-01-25 (1960).
136. See notes 168-71 infra and accompanying text.
187. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 71, at 246,
128. I& at 246-47.
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D. CRIMINAL ACTIONS AGAINST OFFICIALS
Although, in theory, it is always possible to prosecute prison
officials under criminal statutes, the statutes usually are not en-
forced against prison officials. 13 9 In State v. Bruton,4 0 the Supreme
Court of Arkansas dismissed criminal complaints against employees
of the Arkansas penitentiary who had been charged with inflicting
excessive punishment. The court declared that the employees were
not charged under a valid Arkansas statute because the statute,
which authorized the State Penitentiary Board to prescribe the mode
and extent of punishment for prisoners, was an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.' 4' After the dismissal of the charges
by the state court in Arkansas, federal indictments under the
criminal provisions of the Civil Rights Act 4 2 were returned against




The class action suit, which evolved from equity, is an attempt
to remedy the practical problem of joining a large number of
parties in the same action. 1" The class action suit allows suit to
be brought by or against a representative of the class.145 A decree
in favor or against a representative of a class binds every member
of the class.4
The use of class actions by prisoners would benefit prisoners,
prison administrators, and the courts. Since prisoners are often un-
educated and unaware of their rights, a class action may be the
only means by which prisoners can protect their rights and the
rights of fellow inmates.147 The class action benefits prisoners be-
cause it allows one prisoner to sue on behlf of all the other prisoners
who are similarly situated. It is a benefit to prison administrators
because it frees them from the burden of defending against numerous
suits attacking a common problem. The single suit also frees the
courts from hearing repetitious suits.
139. Id. at 275.
140. State v. Bruton, 246 Ark. 288, 437 S.W.2d 795 (1969).
141. Id. at 796-97.
142. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1968) provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom,
wilfully subjects any inhabitant of any state, territory, or District to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or
penalties, on account of such Inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his
color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and If
death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
143. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 71, at 276-77.
144. James, CIviL PRocEDuaE § 510.18, at 494 (1965).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Goldfarb & Singer, aupra note 71, at 282
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In Wilson v. Kelly, 14 8 prisoners confined in state prisons and
jails in Georgia sought by means of a class action: 1) to abolish
racial segregation in the jails and prisons of Georgia; 2) to prevent
discrimination in the hiring of Negroes by penal institutions and
sheriffs; and 3) to abolish all county work camps. 149 The defendant
prison administrators and sheriffs contended that the suit by the
prisoners was not a proper class action under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 150 The court held that the complaint con-
cerning segregated jails was a proper class action on both sides'
5 '
because any question as to whether the prisoners constituted a class
or the propriety of the defendants being representatives of a class
were settled in Washington v. Lee.1
52
The court in Wilson dismissed the second and third causes
of action because the requirements for a class action had not been
met. As to the claim that penal institutions discriminated against
the hiring of Negroes, the court held that since none of the prisoners
or witnesses had ever applied for a job with the Georgia system,
they were not a proper class to allege racial discrimination. 5 3 The
complaint to abolish all county work camps was dismissed primarily
because the court felt that the type and location of institutions was
an administrative matter.
5 4
The main disadvantage to class actions by prisoners is that
judges are reluctant to make broad changes that might affect the
entire prison system of a state. 55 In Ford v. Board of Managers,'
the appellant prisoner sought to bring a class action under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 & 1983 alleging that the defendant prison administrators were
subjecting him and other state prisoners to cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
5 7
In dismissing the class action, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit ruled that a class action was not the proper procedure to
148. Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D.Ga. 1968), affd per curiam, 393 U.S. 266
(1969).
149. Id. at 1008.
150. Id. at 1009.
151. Id. In Wren v. Smith, 410 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1969), Georgia prison inmates sought
an injunction to block the integration ordered in Wilson. Injunctive relief was denied be-
cause appellants were members of the class designated as plaintiffs in Wilson, thus they
were bound by the decision in Wilson.
152. Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D.Ala. 1966). Washington involved a chal-
lenge to the segregation of Alabama prisoners according to race along the same lines as the
challenge In Wilson. The defendants in Washington maintained that the action was not a
proper class action because they were not representative defendants of the other wardens
and jailers of the state of Alabama. In denying the defendants' claim of nonrepresentatlon
the court in Washington said "[S]ince the rule [29] requires only that there be questions
of law and fact common to these defendants and the members of the class which they
represent . . . then it becomes immaterial whether certain of these class defendants are not
otherwise identically situated." Id. at 330.
153. Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005, 1110 (N.D.Ga. 1968), af 'd per curiam, 893 U.S.
266 (1969).
154. Id. at 1012.
155. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 71, at 283.
156. Ford v. Board of Managers, 407 F.2d 937 (3rd Cir. 1969),
157. Id. at 938.
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challenge disciplinary procedures because the circumstances which
surround punishment differ from case to case.158
Although the Supreme Court of the United States held in Harris
v. Nelson'59 that in appropriate circumstances a district court con-
fronted with a writ of habeas corpus may authorize the use of dis-
covery procedures pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, the Court has not taken a position on the use of class actions
for habeas corpus relief." 0 The Court's reluctance to allow class
actions for habeas corpus relief is an outgrowth of the supposed
individuality of the writ of habeas corpus.
To date, the most far reaching decision involving class
action is Holt v. Sarver.16' In that case, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas ruled that the Arkansas prison system
was unconstitutional. The court consolidated eight class actions and
allowed the prisoners to sue on their own behalf, on behalf of other
prisoners, and on behalf of others who may be confined in the
system at a future date.6 2 This sweeping class action decision is
an exception rather than the norm because courts continue to be
reluctant to fashion relief in broad terms applicable to all prisoners
of a particular prison system.
F. POST CoNvICTION RELIEF
Since post conviction relief is dependent on the statutory law
of the forum, post conviction relief will be discussed in reference
to the Uniform - Post - Conviction Procedure Act which was passed
by the North Dakota legislature in 1971.168
G. COMMENT
Although the writ of habeas corpus can be used to seek release
from unconstitutional confinement, that does not- seek the total re-
lease of the prisoner, the Civil Rights Act is becoming the most
prevalent means for a state prisoner to protest the conditions of his
confinement or treatment. The Civil Rights Act is used by state
prisoners mainly because the exhaustion of state remedies require-
ment of habeas corpus does not apply. The use of civil suits by
prisoners will increase because of the growing trend among states
to allow a prisoner to sue during his incarceration. 6 4 The use of
158. Id. at 940.
159. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969).
160. Id. at 295 n.5. "We intimate no view on whether the Federal Rules may be applicable
with respect to the aspects of a habeas corpus proceeding."
161. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 862 (E.D.Ark. 1970).
162. Id. at 364.
163. See notes 172-89 infra and accompanying text
164. See N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 112, § 1 (1973) ; This law is based on the Uniform Act on
Status of Convicted Persons NCCUSL at 295 (1964). As of 1971, the latest date indexed
by the NCCUSL, two states (New Hampshire and Hawaii) have passed the Uniform Act
on Status of Convicted Persons.
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class actions by prisoners should be encouraged, but the judicial
reluctance to grant broad relief will probably limit their use to
actions such as in Holt, in which extreme abuse was evidenced.
H. ACCESS TO NORTH DAKOTA COURTS
1. Capacity of Prisoner to Sue
In North Dakota an individual whose civil rights have been sus-
pended by imprisonment "can maintain no action except those which
concern his personal liberty and are based upon natural rights."
However, if he is named as a defendant in a civil suit, he "may
defend."' 165 This point has been emphasized by the North Dakota
Supreme Court in Miller v. Turner in which the court stated that
an imprisoned felon could not maintain any action except "those
based upon personal liberty or natural rights as distinguished from
legal rights."' 166 In recognition of this disability, the North Dakota
legislature has established a statute designed to toll the statute of
limitations on any civil action which arises while the inmate is im-
prisoned.3
6 7
2. Capacity of Prisoner To Be Sued
Although the right to defend against a civil action is definitively
stated in the North Dakota Century Code, it is not clear whether
the inmate must be personally present at the hearing (s). In Hager
v. Homath, 6 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the North
Dakota courts are "not without power to procure the attendance of
a convicted prisoner, either as a witness or as a defendant ..... log
This language appears to permit the North Dakota courts to compel
attendance whenever they feel that it would be convenient or neces-
sary. This is definitely a minority view.
1'7 0
The prisoner may have an atttorney to represent him in defense
of any court action, but personal counsel is not always available
for the inmate. If the charge is criminal, defense may be provided
by the Public Defender. 1'7 1 If the action is civil in nature, the ability
to obtain counsel may be difficult. A community Legal Aid office
may offer legal assistance to prison inmates, but the legal aid pro-
gram in North Dakota is limited at this time. It follows that the
165. See note 1 aupra.
166. Miller v. Turner, 64 N.D. 463, 467; 253 N.W. 437, 439 (1934).
167. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-25 (1960) ; "The period within which the action must be
brought cannot be extended more than five years by any such disability except infancy, nor
can It be extended in any case longet than one year after the disability cases."
168. Hager v. Homuth, 68 N.D. 84, 276 N.W. 668 (1937).
169. Id. at 91.
170. See, e.g., Application of McNally, 144 Cal. App. 2d 531, 301 P.2d 385 (1956) ; In re
Baywell, 26 Cal. App. 2d 418, 420, 79 P.2d 395 (1938).
171. See Note, Meeting the Challenge of Argersinger: The Publio Defender System in
North Dakota, 49 N.D. L. RPv. 699 (1973).
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inmate who is unable to secure representation is likely to have a
default judgment entered against him. It is not unusual for a divorce
action, creditor action, or some other form of civil action to be filed
against the inmate. Despite the statutory authority to defend, if
legal counsel is not made simple and inexpensive, it is questionable
whether the right to defend does, in fact, exist.
3. Remedies available under the North Dakota Post-Conviction
Procedure Act.
In 1971, the North Dakota legislature enacted a Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act.1 72 Seven other states have enacted similar
legislation.173 The Act is not intended to be a means of appealing
a judgment of conviction. 174 It is, instead, a method of reviewing a
court ruling whereby the "conviction or sentence was in violation of
the laws, Treaties or Constitution of the United States or North
Dakota, if the court was without jurisdiction, or if the sentence
exceeded the maximum authorized by law."1 75 The Act itself is ex-
clusively procedural in effect and does not create new grounds for
the granting of post-conviction relief.1 6
A petitioner may file for relief at any time. 7 7 Relief is initiated
by filing a petition with the Clerk of Court in the county where the
conviction was received. 78 The burden of establishing a basis for
relief rests upon the petitioning defendant. 79 A bare unsupported
allegation will not be considered. 80 Furthermore, the Act will not
provide relief for reconsideration of matters which have been pre-
viously litigated or waived.'"'
To avoid frivolous reviews, the District Court in which the
petition is filed will make a summary study of the petition. The
court then gives the State thirty days to respond to the petition's
allegations. 8 2 After reviewing the petition, the State's response, and
the pertinent court records from the original proceeding, the court
will summarily deny the right to a review or set up a hearing.
172. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 29-32 (Supp. 1973).
173. IDAHO CODE § 19-4901 (Supp. 1973); IOWA CODE § 663 A.1 (Supp. 1970); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 645A (1971) ; NEV. REV. STAT. 177.315 (1967) ; Op- REV. STAT. 138.50 (1971)
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-601 (Supp. 1971) ; S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. 28-52-1 (Supp. 1973).
174. Bulluck v. Warden of Md. Penitentiary, 220 Md. 658, 152 A.2d 184 (1959).
175. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32-01 (Supp. 1973).
176. Woods v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 945, 953 (D.Md. 1962).
177. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32-03 (Supp. 1973).
178. Id.
179. Stale v. Rudolph, 193 N.W.2d 237, 243 (N.D. 1971).
180. Smith v. Warden of Md. Penitentiary, 238 Md. 27, 207 A.2d 484 (1965); See also
Fanning v. State, 85 S.D. 246, 180 N.W.2d 853 (1970) ; Walker v. State, 92 Idaho 517, 446
P.2d 886 (1968) State v. Riley, 193 N.W.2d 455 (N.D. 1971). In Riley an unsupported
assertion of the defendant that he pleaded guilty because he would receive a suspended
sentence was insufficient grounds to attack conviction under the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act.
181. Jordan v. Steiner, 184 F. Supp. 432 (D.Md. 1960).
182. N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-32-06(1) (Supp. 1973).
NoTEs
If the court summarily denies the petition, the applicant is given
an opportunity to respond. 183 If the petition merits a review, a hear-
ing date will be set. It is not clear if the petitioner will be allowed
to leave the penitentiary for the hearing.1 8 4 The proceedings are
evidentiary in nature and both parties may introduce evidence. The
court makes its findings based on the evidence produced at the
hearing. 185 The decision may be appealed by the petitioner or the
State to the North Dakota Supreme Court. 86
The basis of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act has
been summarized by the Maryland Supreme Court in Brady v. State
in which the court said: "The aim of this section is to bring to-
gether and consolidate into one statute all the remedies, beyond
those that are incidental to the usual procedures of trial and review,
which are available for challenging the validity of the sentence.'
8 7
By consolidation, it is conceivable that the number of repeated
collateral attacks on a criminal conviction can be reduced to a
single hearing, thus economizing the courts time. At the same time
the act provides, within clearly defined limits, the right of appellate
review for the individual who feels he is illegally incarcerated. The
Act does not replace the writ of habeas corpus or other procedures
for review. Rather, it is an expansion of the prisoner's remedies.'88
In the event that the individual feels he has been denied a fair
review, he has a right to appeal to the North Dakota Supreme
Court.18 9
IV. PRISONER'S CIVIL RIGHTS IN NORTH DAKOTA
A. RIGHT TO VOTE
Section 127 of the North Dakota Constitution states that "no
person who is under guardianship . . . shall be qualified to vote
at any election; nor shall any person convicted of treason or felony
unless restored to civil rights. . ... -10 The North Dakota Supreme
Court in State ex. rel. Olson v. Langer, defined felony as "a crime
which is or may be punishable with death or imprisonment in the
penitentiary."'' A felony conviction in some other jurisdiction, even
though a misdemeanor in North Dakota, forfeits the civil right to
vote in a North Dakota election.1
9
2
183. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32-06(2) (Supp. 1973).
184. See notes 68-189 supra, and accompanying text.
185. State v. Decker, 181 N.W.2d 746, 754 (N.D. 1970).
186. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32-09 (SuPp. 1973).
187. Brady v. State, 222 Md. 442, 160 A.2d 912, 915 (1960) ; see also Dionne v. State, 93
Idaho 235, 459 P.2d 1017, 1019 (1969) : where the court stated, "the proper use of the act
is to avoid repetitious and successive applications, eliminate confusion, and yet protect the
applicant's constitutional rights."
188. Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 285, 459 P.2d 1017, 1019 (1969).
189. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 29-32-09 (Supp. 1973).
190. N.D. CONST. § 127; N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-01-04 (1971).
191. State ex. rel. Olson v .Langer, 65 N.D. 68, 85, 256 N.W. 377, 384 (1934).
192. Salisbury v. Vogel, 65 N.D. 137, 256 N.W. 404 (1934).
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It is interesting to note the North Dakota Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of section 127.198 The court has indicated that it is the
characteristic displayed by committing the felony, not the felony,
that leads to disqualification. The purpose of the disability is "the
protection of the state by denying the privilege of the franchise to
those whose unfitness is evidenced by conviction of felony. The
disqualification is not a penaly. It is merely a consequence attendant
on, and incident to, the doing of the felonious Act."'1' The felon will
be denied the right to vote until his civil rights are restored. Until
that time, the North Dakota Century Code makes it a misdemeanor
for him if he offers or attempts to vote.195
Voting rights are not directly denied by statute to pre-conviction
prisoners, but there is an indirect disability in a county that does not
provide voting facilities at the jail or prison, a means of trans-
portation to get to the polls, or an absentee ballot.
Illinois' absentee ballot statute is similar to that of North Da-
kota. 96 Under this statute, it was constitutional to deny issuance of
absentee ballots to two inmates in the Cook County jail even though no
alternative means of voting was provided. 97 An absentee ballot here
was denied because the inmates were incarcerated in Cook County,
their residence. Since an absentee ballot cannot be issued unless the
applicant is absent from the county of his residence, the court con-
cluded that the Illinois statute was uniform with other jurisdictions
and was reasonable. But in dictum, the court stated that upon a
showing that an alternative means of voting was not available, the
right to vote would have been denied."'
Although the Supreme Court of the United States has recogniz-
ed the right to vote as a fundamental right enjoyed by citizens in
a democratic society' 99 and has demanded that infringement of vot-
ing rights be "carefully and meticulously scrutinized, '2 00 the Court
has been unwilling to declare state disenfranchisement statutes un-
constitutional. The reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United
193. ,See note 190 supra.
194. State ex. rel. Olson v. Langer, 65 N.D. 68, 90, 256 N.W. 377, 387 (1934).
195. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-11-04 (1960).
196. ILL. RLV. STAT. ch. 46, § 19-1 (Supp. 1973) : Under the Illinois statute absentee bal-
lots are made available to four classes of persons: (1) Those who are absent from the
county of residence for any reason whatsoever; (2) Those who are "physically incapaci-
tated" so long as they present an affidavit to that effect from licensed physician; (3)
Those whose observance of a religious holiday precludes attendance at the polls; and (4)
Those who are serving as poll watchers in precincts.
197. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs. of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
198. The ramifications of this policy in North Dakota should be clear. For example, if a
prisoner who is a resident of Grand Forks County Is incarcerated before conviction in the
Grand Forks County jail he does not qualify for an absentee ballot. If he awaits trial in
any other county or the state penitentiary he does qualify for an absentee ballot. The ques-
tion remains whether or not provisions are made available by our voting officials, where
the absentee ballot is not made available.
199. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
200. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
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States is similar to that found in a North Dakota decision, State
ex. rel Olson v. Langer, where the North Dakota court stated, "the
manifest purpose of such restrictions upon the right to vote is to
preserve the purity of the election. The presumption is that one
rendered infamous by conviction of a felony, . . . is unfit to exercise
the privilege of suffrage. ' 20 1
B. RIGHT TO HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE
In North Dakota an individual seeking public office must qualify
as an elector. As previously discussed, any individual sentenced to
imprisonment at the penitentiary loses his right of suffrage. 2 02 It
follows that imprisonment disables this individual from holding pub-
lic office.2 03 If a citizen is elected to public office prior to convic-
tion, his office shall be vacated upon conviction "of any felony or
any offense involving moral turptitude or violation of his official
oath. ' 20 4 In State v. Vogel the North Dakota Supreme Court clarified
one aspect of this statute by stating, "the conviction of a felony
ipso facto causes a vacancy in public office. ' 2 0 5 Upon restoration of
civil rights, the felon again possesses the capacity to run for public
office.
20 6
C. RIGHT OF A PRISONER TO CONTRACT
The North Dakota Code does not specifically exclude convicts
from contracting. The only contractual disabilities in the North Da-
kota statutes apply to "minors and persons of unsound mind.' '20 7 The
civil death statute acknowledges that an inmate can contract to sell
and convey his property. The North Dakota Supreme Court has in-
terpreted this statute narrowly. The court stated', "the provisions of
the last two sections (combined in 1943 to form the present civil
death statute) must not be construed to render the person therein
mentioned incapable of making and acknowledging a sale or convey-
ance of property. While a convict cannot make contracts generally
201. State ex. rel. Olson v. Langer, 65 N.D. 68, 86, 256 N.W. 377, 385 (1934).
202. For a discussion by the Supreme Court of the United States on civil death statutes
see Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266 (1948). N.D. CONST. § 127; N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-01-01
(1960) ; See generally notes 190-201 upra and accompanying text.
203. A public office in its broadest sense has been outlined by the court in Pope v. Com-
missioner, 138 F.2d 1006, 1009 (6th Cir. 1943). The basic criteria for a public office was':
(1) It must be created by the Constitution or the legislature, or by a municipality or other
body within authority conferred by the Legislature; (2) There must be a delegation of a
portion of the sovereign powers of government to be exercised for the benefit of the pub-
lic; (8) The powers conferred and the duties to be discharged must be defined either di-
rectly or indirectly by the Legislature or through legislative authority; (4) The duties
must be performed independently and without control of a superior power other than the
law; and (5) The office must have some permanency and continuity and the officers must
take an official oath.
204. N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-02-01(8) (1960).
205. State v. Vogel, 65 N.D. 137, 143, 256 N.W. 404, 407 (1934).
206. See notes 294-96 infra and accompanying text.
207. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-02-01 (1959).
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under this last section, he can make contracts as are necessary for
disposition of his property only. He has no authority to make any
other kind of a contract. .. *" under this section. 208 The above com-
ment does not prohibit the making of general contracts. It simply
does not authorize them under the statute. It is concluded, in the
absence of any state statute specifically prohibiting the right to con-
tract, that the inmate is free to make contracts. However, enforc-
ing the contract would be difficult because the inmate is prohibited
from bringing a judicial action. 20 9 Therefore, the inmate is permit-
ted to contract by the prison officials, but is denied access to the
courts to enforce his contractual rights while he is incarcerated.
D. RIGHT To MAKE A WILL
The laws of North Dakota provide that "any person eighteen
years of age or older may make a will disposing of all or any part
of his estate. ' 210 Any part not disposed of will pass through intes-
tacy.21' The North Dakota Supreme Court has clarified this provi-
sion. In Storman v. Weiss the court stated that there is "no statu-
tory requirement for capacity to make a will other than that the
testator must be a person eighteen years of age or older. ' 212 This
indicates that a prisoner is free to make a legally enforceable will
during his incarceration.
E. RIGHT To ACT As A WITNESS
At common law, a conviction for treason or felony, or a mis-
demeanor involving dishonesty or obstruction of justice, rendered
the convicted person incompetent as a witness.213 North Dakota has
retained a fragment of the common law disability. If a person is
convicted of perjury or subordination of perjury, he cannot testify
on his own behalf or for any other parties in any action.
21 4
Incarceration does not prevent the inmate from appearing as a
witness. 215 The testimony may be given by the inmate in open court,
but absent special circumstances the testimony will be taken by dep-
osition in the prison. The inmate or ex-inmate carries a great dis-
ability when he testifies because his credibility may be impeached
by establishing his crminal record. The question of impeachment
was considered by the territorial courts of North Dakota. In Terri-
tory v. O'Hare, the court stated that, "the right to cross-examine as
208. Miller v. Turner, 64 N.D. 463, 467, 253 N.W. 437, 439 (1934).
209. See note 2 supra; see also notes 165-89 supra and accompanying text.
210. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-02-01 (1972).
211. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-03, (1972).
212. Storman v. Weiss, 65 N.W.2d 475, 505 (N.D. 1954).
213. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 43, at 84 (2d ed. 1972).
214. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-08 (1960).
215. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-03-16 (1960).
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to outside matters of fact, which affect the general character of the
witness, and tend to degrade him, and affect his credibility, is with-
in the limits of sound juidcial discretion, a salutary rule. ' ' 216 For im-
peachment purposes the questioner is limited to questions concern-
ing the name of the crime, the time and place of conviction, and
the punishment.217 He may not be asked on cross-examination if he
has been arrested for committing any particular act, because an
arrest is not proof of guilt.218 Although the weight of a witness' tes-
timony and the credibility of a witness are matters to be determined
by the jury,21 9 the fact that the ex-inmates testimony is questioned
despite any relationship between the previous crime and the present
testimony is a serious civil disability for the ex-inmate. Furthermore,
in North Dakota, the witness will not be allowed to explain the mat-
ter or circumstances surrounding the previous conviction. "To per-
mit an explanation would be to permit an inquiry into a collateral
matter that had been (previously) disposed of."
'220
F. RIGHT TO SERVE AS A JUROR
The North Dakota code prohibits any citizen who has lost the
right to vote because of imprisonment in the penitentiary from serv-
ing as a juror. 221 Once civil rights are restored, the citizen will be
entitled to serve on a jury,2 2 2 and will be subject to jury duty call.
G. RIGHT TO SERVE AS AN EXECUTOR, ADMINISTRATOR,
GUARDIAN, OR TRUSTEE
The North Dakota code prohibits any person who has been con-
victed of a felony from serving as an administrator, executor or
guardian. 223 An ex-felon could serve as a trustee since he is empow-
ered to hold and disperse property. While incarcerated, an inmate
named as a trustee would be unable to fulfill the duties of his ap-
pointment because of his immobility. Upon failing to perform his
duties he could be discharged by the District Court.2 4 In other words
the law does not preclude him from acting as a trustee, but his
imprisonment prevents him from effectively exercising his duties.
216. Territory v. O'Hare, 1 N.D. 30, 44, 44 N.W. 1003, 1008 (1890) ; see also State v. Fury,
53 N.D. 333, 205 N.W. 877 (1925).
217. State v. Moe, 151 N.W.2d 310 (N.D. 1967); see also State v. Kent, 5 N.D. 516, 67
N.W. 1052 (1896) ; State v. Rozum, 8 N.D. 548, 80 NW. 477 (1899).
218. State v. McCray, 99 N.W.2d 321, 325 (N.D. 1959).
219. State v. Holte, 87 N.W.2d 47, 48 (N.D. 1957).
220. State v. Keillor, 50 N.D. 728, 734, 197 N.W. 859, 861 (1924).
221. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-08 (1) (Supp. 1973).
222. Until 1971 when the former disqualification statute was repealed, the right to serve
as a juror was not restored. (Law of March 9, 1921, ch. 81, § 1 [1921] N.D. CENT. CODE
27-09-02 (repealed 1971)).
223. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-11-01(3) (1960).
224. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-02-20(6) (1960).
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H. RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS
1. Grounds for Divorce
Conviction of a felony under North Dakota Law is grounds for
divorce by the inmate's spouse.22 5 Although an inmate's spouse can
start a divorce proceeding against the inmate, it is doubtful if an
inmate could maintain an action for divorce while he is in prison,
since he cannot bring a civil action.
2 6
If children are involved in the divorce proceedings, the court
will consider the specific facts involved and determine which alter-
native is in the child's best interest. 227 The non-incarcerated spouse
usually receives custody because the incarcerated spouse is in no
position to care for the children. A difficult situation arises where
neither parent possesses the necessary qualities to properly care for
the children. In such a case the court can transfer the children to
a foster home or adoption agency. When the imprisoned spouse is
released, he can petition the court to vacate or modify the divorce
decree and grant him custody of the children.
228
When an incarcerated spouse determines that his spouse is no
longer capable of caring for the children, he cannot seek custody
through a divorce because he has lost his civil right to bring a civil
action. It would appear that his only recourse is to ask a community
welfare agency to file a petition for termination of parental rights.
22
Relinquishment of parental rights is, however, a double edged sword.
The wife could conceivably use the same tool to terminate his par-
ental rights. Under such a termination, even the natural parent's
right to consent to adoption is lost.
I. RIGHT OF STATE FARM AND PENETENTIARY PRISONERS TO
RECEIVE THE SAME BENEFITS AS COUNTY PRISONERS
There is an inconsistency in North Dakota law between payments
received by county prisoners and payments received by prisoners
sentenced either to the State Farm or the Penitentiary. The North
Dakota Century Code28 0 provides that convicts sentenced to a county
jail or workhouse will receive credit for labor to be applied against
any judgment for fine and costs. The prisoner receives five dollars
credit for each day of labor performed. Prisoners sentenced to the
State Farm or the Penitentiary do not receive a five dollar credit
for labor to be applied against any judgment for fine and costs.
225. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-03(6) (1971).
226. See notes 165-171 supra.
227. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22 (1971); See also Kucera v. Kucera, 117 N.W.2d 810 (N.D.
1962).
228. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22 (1971).
229. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-19(5) (1971) & § 27-20-44 (Supp. 1979).
230. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-44-83 (Supp. 1973).
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Arguably, the denial of the five dollar credit to State Farm and
Penitentiary prisoners is a denial of equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by Sections 11 and 20231 of the North Dakota Constitution
and Section 1232 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
a command directed to the states that persons similarly situated be
given "equal protection of the laws of the state. The Equal Protec-
tion Clause recognizes that a state may classify its citizens and treat
them differently, but any such classification should include all the
persons who are in a similar situation.2 3 To determine whether the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
violated, a court looks first to ascertain if the classification is rea-
sonable. 2 4 The reasonableness of a classification, is weighed in
terms of the purpose for which the statute in question was enacted.
If reasonable, the court looks to the statute and determines the pur-
pose from the statutory language. If the purpose of the statute can
be determined from the language itself, it is not necessary for the
court to look at legislative history or ancillary materials.
235
In State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc. 23 6 , the North Dakota Supreme
Court has declared that the constitutional safeguard of equal pro-
tection is violated only if the classification is founded on grounds
that are "wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objec-
tive. ' ' 23 7 The court in Gamble Skogmo, Inc. continued by saying
that state legislatures are presumed to act within their constitutional
power and a statute which discriminates will not be set aside if any
state of facts will reasonably justify the statute.23s Arguably, since
Gamble was decided the Supreme Court of the United States has-
begun to abandon the old equal protection by which the judiciary de-
ferred to the legislature and upheld classifications if any reason for
231. See N.D. CONST. §§ 11, 20.
Sec. 11.
.All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.
Sec. 20.
No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be
altered, revoked or repealed by the legislative assembly; nor shall any citizen or
class of citizens be granted privileges or immunities which upon the same terms
shall not be granted to all citizens.
232. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No state shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person or life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
233. Comment, supra note 37, at 1076.
234. Id. at 1077.
235. Id.
236. State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 749, 758 (N.D. 1966).
237. 14.
288. Id.
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the classification could be found. Professor Gunther in his Forward
concerning the 1971 Supreme Court term said, "Judicial deference
to a broad range of conceivable legislative purposes and to imagin-
able facts that might justify classifications is strikingly diminish-
ed.,,P2s9
The purpose of section 12-44-33 of the North Dakota Century Code
(Supp. 1973) is to provide convicted prisoners with a means of pay-
ing any judgment for fine and costs. By giving a convicted county
prisoner a five dollar credit per day in return for labor performed,
the legislature has sought to lighten the already heavy burden of
the convicted prisoner. The purpose of the statute is constitutional,
but section 12-44-33 seems to violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment because the classification which includes
only county prisoners is not reasonable in light of the purpose of
the statute. 24 0 Section 12-44-33 appears to be underinclusive. Under-
inclusion occurs when a state benefits or burdens persons in a way
which is within a legitimate state purpose but the state does not
give the same benefit or burden to persons who are in a similar
position.241 Underinclusion, if arbitrary, is a denial of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2 42
Courts often hold that underinclusion does not violate equal pro-
tection because the legislatures are free to recognize degrees of evil
and remedy wrongs that they think are most acute. 248 This is an
abandonment of the theory that the classification must include all
who are in the same position. 24 4 One could not say that the legis-
lature was looking to degrees of evil and sought only to help county
prisoners because section 12-44-33 was not enacted to remedy evils.
It was enacted to benefit convicted prisoners who already bear a
heavy burden. 245 This benefit should be conferred on State Farm and
Penitentiary prisoners as well as county prisoners.
There are two other rationales for tolerating underinclusion .
2
First, administrative necessity often limits what a state can accom-
plish. This exception to the underinclusion prohibition is tolerated to
allow a state to embark upon change which would have to be de-
layed if everyone in the class had to be included.2 47 Secondly, un-
239. Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L. REv. 20 (1972).
240. Comment, supra note 37, at 1082.
241. Id. at 1084.
242. Id. See also Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
243. Comment, supra note 37, at 1084.
244. Id.
245. Although there are no exact figures as to how many State Farm and Penitentiary
inmates have judgment and costs expenses unpaid, the authors feel that the cost to the
state for including State Farm and Penitentiary inmates would not be excessive.
246. Comment, supra note 87, at 1085.
247. Id. One of the major reasons states make only limited changes is that they often
lack the monetary resources necessary to make changes which would effect all that are
similarly situated.
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derinclusion is often tolerated if the state is not convinced the stat-
ute enacted is wise or the legislature may not be able to get the
majority of its members to extend the coverage of the statute.
24 1
Neither of the above two reasons for allowing underinclusion would
seem applicable to N.D.C.C. 12-44-33. There would be no great finan-
cial burden on the state if State Farm and Penitentiary prisoners
were allowed the five dollar per day credit that county prisoners
are allowed. Also, it seems doubtful that N.D.C.C. 12-44-33 was en-
acted only for county prisoners because it was thought by the legis-
lature that the statute was of doubtful merit or that the legislature
was not able to get a majority to include State Farm and Peni-
tentiary prisoners along with county prisoners.
N.D.C.C. 12-44-33 is a denial of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment because of its underinclusiveness. It
should be amended to include State Farm and Penitentiary prison-
ers. All prisoners, whether they are at the State Farm, Peniten-
tiary, county jail or workhouse, should be allowed to receive the
five dollar per day credit in return for labor performed.
J. RIGHT TO FULL BENEFITS OF FUNDS EARNED WHILE IN PRISON
Sections 12-48-16, 2 49 12-48-17,250 12-48-18251 and 12-48-19252 of the
North Dakota Century Code require that a percentage of the money
earned by a prisoner at the Penitentiary be deposited to the credit
of the prisoners' general benefit fund.
The prisoners' general benefit fund is used to provide entertain-
ment and amusement for the benefit of all prisoners.2 5 3 Five per
cent of the gross earnings of a prisoner is deposited in the prison-
ers' general benefit fund if he has less than fifty dollars in his
temporary aid account. 254 When a prisoner with dependent relatives
has more than fifty dollars in his temporary aid account, ten per
cent is deposited in the prisoners' general benefit fund. 255 Twenty-
five per cent of gross earnings is deposited in the prisoner's general
benefit fund if the prisoner has more than fifty dollars in his tem-
porary aid account and he has no dependent relatives.
256
Since an inmate can make a maximum of one dollar a day,
this forced contribution to the prisoners' general benefit fund creates
a hardship on many inmates. 257 The prisoners' general benefit fund
248. Id.
249. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-48-16 (1960).
250. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-48-17 (1960).
251. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-48-18 (1960).
252. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-48-19 (1960).
253. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-48-15 (1960).
254. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-48-16(2) to -18(2) (1960).
255. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-48-17(2) (1960).
256. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-48-19(2) (1960).
257. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-48-14 (1973).
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was created years ago at the request of the inmates to provide a
fund for the purchase of various recreation equipment at a time
when there was no money available for this purpose. 258 This forced
contribution deprives an inmate of spending his meager earnings
according to his own desires.2 9 The prisoners' general benefit fund
should be funded by the state as a part of its general appropriation
to the prison.
K. RIGHT TO RECEIVE INTEREST
North Dakota law does not provide for the payment of interest
on money held by a prisoner in any of his prison accounts. Recently
Warden Robert Landon initiated a program to allow "long timers"
with a substantial balance in their accounts to deposit their money
in interest bearing accounts or notes in Bismarck.2 60 The opportu-
nity for an inmate to deposit his savings in an interest bearing ac-
count should be authorized by statute so that this benefit is not left
to the discretion of each individual warden.
26
1
L. RIGHT TO RECEIVE COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES
Federal prisoners who are injured while incarcerated are de-
nied workmen's compensation, but they may receive benefits from
the Prison Industries Fund. 2 2 Benefits from the fund can be received
only upon the release of the inmate. All benefits are withdrawn if
an inmate recovers or dies from his injury during imprisonment.
The amount of compensation is determined by the Attorney General
and is limited to the amounts recoverable under the Federal Em-
ployees' Compensation Act.2 83 The awards do not cover pain and suf-
fering. Furthermore, a subsequent criminal conviction disqualifies
the inmate from all benefits. 264 If the injury received by the inmate
is the result of negligence of a federal employee, an inmate not with-
in the protection of the Prison Industries Fund may seek compen-
Section 1.
COMPENSATION OF INMATES. Prisoners engaged in carrying on the work of the
penitentiary and its industries, the work of other state institutions and their industries, or
upon the public highways, shall receive not less than ten cents nor more than one dollar
per day for the work actually performed ....
258. Conversation with Warden Robert Landon at the North Dakota Penitentiary on July
11, 1973.
259. Some inmates do not partake in any of the programs offered by the fund. Many in-
mates would prefer to spend their money on reading material or other endeavors.
260. Id. Warden Robert Landon considers "long timers" to be those prisoners who have
more than a one year sentence. A substantial balance according to Warden Landon would
be over fifty dollars in a prisoner's account. Warden Landon believes that limiting the
availability of interest bearing accounts to "long timers" who have a substantial balance
is necessary because the administrative burdens of carrying out this program would be too
great if men with short sentences and small balances were included.
261. Statutory law in California allows an inmate the option of investing his money in
interest bearing accounts or certain limited securities. CAL. PEN. CODE § 5008 (West 1970).
262. Id.
263. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8102-50 (1964).
264. Comment, supra note 5, at 1189.
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sation under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 265 When both the Prison
Industries Fund and the Federal Tort Claims Act are applicable,
federal courts have ruled that an inmate must seek relief from the
Prison Industries Fund.
266
Most states do not provide compensation to prisoners for injuries
received while working at a prison.2 7 At least five states have stat-
utes barring prisoners from receiving workmen's compensation bene-
fits. 2 68 In the absence of a specific statute, the courts and attorney
general's opinions in fourteen states have disallowed such benefits.26 9
The decisions denying workmen's compensation in states that do not
specifically bar such benefits generally base the denial on the def-
inition of "employee" or "contract for hire" incorporated in the
workmen's compensation laws.2 70 The courts have held that an in-
mate who is required to do labor by law cannot enter into a "con-
tract for hire."27 1 A prisoner cannot be an employee of the state
even though he receives compensation for his services.
27 2
Some states have allowed prisoners to recover under workmen's
compensation or by civil suit for injuries received while working in
a prison2 7 8 and at least five states allow prisoners to recover under
their respective workmen's compensation laws.2 7 4 Other states have
waived their governmental immunity and allow persons to institute
civil suits for negligence against the state.2 75 Three cases which al-
lowed prisoners to receive workmen's compensation for injuries, ab-
sent a statute, involved prisoners who were working on a road crew,27 6
or were loaned to another governmental agency or private group.2 77
Since the North Dakota Penitentiary makes a profit on its pri-
son industries,2 7 8 North Dakota should follow the federal example and
set up a fund from the prison industries which would compensate
an inmate who is injured while working in the prison.
265. Id.
266. United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966).
267. Comment, supra note 5, at 1140.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1141.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See Watson v. Industrial Comm'n, 100 Ariz. 327, 414 P.2d 144 (1966).
273. Comment, supra note 5, at 1141.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See California Highway Comm'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 200 Cal. 44, 251 P.
808 (1926). The case was decided before California adopted its current statute which pro-
hibits prisoners from receiving workmen's compensation. See CAL. PIN. CODE § 2700 (West
1970).
277. Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 88 Ariz. 354, 356 P.2d 1021 (1960).
278. Because of the complex accounting methods used by the state, it is hard to deter-
mine what profit the prison industries make but the prison industries do make a profit.
Conversation with Charles Simonson, Business Manager of the North Dakota Penitentiary
on Friday, July 13, 1973.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
M. RIGHT TO HOLD, RECEIVE AND TRANSFER PROPERTY
1. Divestment
There is no disability under the North Dakota civil disability
statute to prevent an inmate from transferring his property.
27 9
2. Inheritance
The North Dakota Code does not prevent an inmate from inher-
iting286 unless he murdered the person from whom he is inheriting.28 1
Also, the inmate can inherit through intestacy if he falls into the
appropriate classification.
2 2
3. Transfer of property when abandoned or imprisoned
Although the prisoner has the right to control the conveyance of
his property, this right may be preempted by the North Dakota Code
Section 14-07-12.283 In this section, abandonment of one spouse by the
other spouse for a period of over one year, where the absent spouse
is imprisoned in a jail or the penitentiary, is grounds for a court
order allowing the abandoned spouse to "manage, control or encum-
ber the incarcerated spouse's property for support and family main-
tenance and for the purpose of paying debts contracted before pri-
son."
4. Right to Appoint a Representative to Protect the Prisoner's
Property.
284
The North Dakota Century Code does not provide for the appoint-
ment of a representative to act as a fiduciary for the inmate while
he is in prison. Several states have provisions allowing an inmate
to appoint a fiduciary.2 5 Furthermore, there seems to be a general
trend to allow such appointments.
In the absence of such a statute, the inmate must create a bail-
ment or power of attorney to protect his property.2 8 A bailment is
279. N D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-27 (1960).
The statute states "any person shall be capable of making and acknowledging a sale or
conveyance of his property .. "
280. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-02-01 (1972).
281. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-04-23 (1972).
282. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-04 (1972).
283. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-12 (1971).
284. Although N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-07-12 (1971) does provide a court appointed fiduciary
to administer the inmates real and personal property and is considered by some states to
be an adequate provision to oversee the inmates property, this statute is very negative by
its wording and is only exercised after a years abandonment. Furthermore, it is usually
exercised to pay the debts incurred by the family or incurred by the inmate. It is the
opinion of the authors that a more positive statute should be adopted in the form of an
administrator to oversee the property, upon the inmates request, from the date of incar-
ceration. The basic purpose of the aforementioned statute could still be met, while at the
same time the property would possibly be enhanced. See, e.g., HAwAJI § 355-34 (1955)
MAINE tit. 18, § 3601 (1959) ; NEW YORK ch. 14, § 850 (1929).
285. Id.
286. Another possibility would be the establishment of a revocable private trust but the
civil death statute provides for the forfeiture of all private trusts. The assumption is there-
fore made that a private trust cannot be created by an inmate under civil disabilities.
NOTES
established when one person gives his possessions to another to be
kept for the benefit of the party giving up possession.2 7 Likewise,
the inmate can exercise a general power of attorney 2 8 Both methods
are risky because the inmate has no access to the courts. First, the
inmate does not have recourse if the bailee or other agent wastes
the property.29 Second, the bailee or other agent is encumbered by
the same disabilities that encumber the principal. 90 Therefore, such
bailee or agent cannot go to court to protect the property.
N. RIGHT TO RECEIVE A PENSION
Private pension funds are generally unaffected by criminal con-
viction unless they are not vested at the time of conviction or there
is a special divestment provision in the company's pension policy.
Public pension funds are affected by criminal conviction. Conviction
of a felony in North Dakota can result in the loss of pension rights
for city employees, 291 police officers 292 and employees of the park
districts.29 There is no consideration of the relationship between the
crime committed and the loss of the pension fund. It is of interest
to note that while a policeman will lose his pension, a judge or
fireman will not lose his pension. This inconsistency is without any
apparent justification.
0. RESTORATION OF CMIL RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES
In North Dakota the Board of Pardons has the authority to re-
store an inmate's Civil Rights at any time.2 9 4 The Board members
are the Governor, the Attorney General, the Chief Justice of the Su-




The power of restoration appears to be discretionary. Upon applica-
tion by the inmate, the Board can restore civil rights at any time.
298
1. Areas Where Civil Disabilities Are Not Restored
Even though the Board of Pardons purports to restore an in-
mate's civil rights, certain disabilities remain. The most apparent
area is that of employment. In the private sector, a criminal record
may lead to summary rejection when alternative non-criminal per-
287. N.D. CENT. CODE § 60-01-02 (1960).
288. For general discussion on the principal-agent relationship, see I. A. ScoTT, TRUSTS § 8
(3d ed. 1967).
289. See notes 165-71 aupra and accompanying text.
290. See note 229 supra.
291. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-46-16 (2960).
292. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-45-15 (1968).
293. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-49-21 (1968).
294. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-55-24 (1960) : The board of pardons may restore to civil rights
any person convicted of any offense committed against the state, upon cause being shown,
after the execution or expiration of sentence or any other time.
295. N .D. CENT. CODE § 12-55-01 (Supp. 1973).
296. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-55-24 (1960).
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sonnel are available. 297 The ex-inmate may be prevented from em-
ployment because he lacks the skill or educational requirements for
the job2 9 8 or inability to secure the necessary bond for employment
from a fidelity insurance company.
299
Many other ex-inmates are denied employment opportunities be-
cause they are unable to obtain the necessary license through the
state licensing agency. The refusal may be exercised by a statute
that directly states that a license will not be granted to an indi-
vidual who has been convicted of a felony or some other violation,
or refusal may be exercised indirectly by requiring that an appli-
cant be of "good moral character." North Dakota's Code contains
a long list of disabilities. A license will be directly refused or re-
voked from an abstractor,30 0 an accountant,30 1 a barber, 0 2 an MD,8 °8
a plumber, 30 4 a massage parlor,305 a dentist,306 an insurance agent,
307
or an individual seeking a liquor license38 for the "conviction of a
felony." A license will be directly refused or revoked from a chiro-
podist,80 9 a child placing agency, 310 and a children's home11 for con-
viction of a crime involving moral turpitude,3 1 2 an architect upon
conviction of "fraud," 313 and a real estate agent upon "conviction of
embezzlement, forgery, obtaining money by false pretenses, extor-
tion, conspiracy to defraud or other like offense."3 14 Conviction of a
felony will also result in disbarrrnent of a lawyer from the legal pro-
fession.31 5
The state licensing agencies may indirectly deny licenses in
several fields upon a showing that the applicant is not of "good moral
character." Several of the professions already mentioned also re-
quire good moral character.3 6 Other fields requiring good moral
character include embalming s 7 and pharmacy.18 A license could be
297. Comment, supra note 5, at 1001.
298. Id.
299. Lykke, Attitude of Bonding Companies Toward Probationers and Parolees, 21 FED.
PROB. 36 (1951).
300. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-01-06(1)( (1960).
301. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-02-12(1) (1960).
302. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-04-40 (1). (1960).
803. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-31(3) (1960).
304. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-18-18(1) (1960).
305. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-25-10(2) (1960).
306. N'.D. CENT. CODE § 48-28-18(3) (1960).
307. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-17-01.12 (1970).
308. N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-05-03(2) (1959).
309. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-05-16(5) (1960).
310. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-12-10(4) (1960).
311. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-11-07(4) (1960).
312. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-26-11(3) (1960).
813. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-03-20(1) (1960).
314. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-23-11(f) (1960).
315. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-14-02 (1960).
316. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-02-10 (1960) (accountant) § 43-04-23 (1960) (bar-
ber); § 43-05-11(2) (1960) (chiropodist).
317. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-10-11(1) (1960).
818. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-15-15(2) (1960).
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denied a chiropractor upon showing of "dishonorable, unprofessional
or immoral conduct."819
The area of employment is an example of how a states laws
affecting felons are overbroad and inconsistent. The statute creates
disabilities in areas where they are not necessary for the public
health and safety. For example, why should an ex-felon be deprived
of a license to operate as a barber, plumber, or dentist? There seems
to be no rational connection between the licensing standard and the
crime committed. This deprivation appears to be nothing more
than post-conviction punishment which keeps the ex-felon out of the
labor market and seriously affects the progress of his readjustment.
The area of employment exemplifies how inconsistent a state's laws
can be. Why should a man in one field be prevented from receiv-
ing his license because of his record when a man in another field
is not similarly affected?
V. NEW CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
The 1973 North Dakota Legislature passed a bill which repeals
section 12-06-27 and replaces it with a progressive bill guaranteeing
an inmate "all of his rights, political, personal, civil, and other-
wise. ' 32 0 The bill will become operative on July 1, 1975. To what de-
gree does the new act guarantee a convicted individual his civil rights?
The new law is divided into two sections, "rights lost"3 21 and
"rights retained. ' 3 22 The first section, "rights lost," concerns the
right to vote and hold public office. Under the present civil death
statute, both of these rights are lost. Under this law, the imprison-
ed individual has to ask for a restoration of these rights from the
Board of Pardons. The restoration can be granted "after the ex-
piration or execution of the sentence or at any other time."328 The
new law provides for automatic restoration upon receipt of parole
which emphasizes a changed attitude toward the concept of civil
disabilities. The present law takes civil rights from the individual
indefinitely and restores them at the discretion of the Board of Par-
dons. The whole process emphasizes the punitive nature of correc-
tions. Under the new law the civil rights will remain vested in the
imprisoned individual subject to temporary divestment. At the time
of parole, the civil rights will be automatically restored.
By specifically stating that a person convicted of a crime "re-
tains all his rights, political, personal, civil and other." The legis-
lature has clearly placed the North Dakota Civil death statute to
B19. N.D. CLNT. COD § 43-06-15(1) (1960).
320. Act of July 1, 1975, ch. 116, § 12.1-33-02, (1973] N.D. Laws, 43rd Sess.
321. Act of July 1, 1975, ch. 116, § 12.1-33-01, [1973] N.D. Laws, 43rd Sess.
322. Ch. 116, § 12.1-33-02, [1973] N.D. Laws, 43rd Sess.
323. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-55-24 (1960).
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rest.3 24 But the extent to which the new statute will enhance the
individual's rights is not clear. Specifically, the statute has included
the right to hold public office or employment, to vote, to hold, re-
ceive and transfer property, to enter into contracts, to sue and be
sued, and to hold offices of private trust in accordance with law
as areas to be affected by the change. But several of the above
mentioned areas were not disabled before the new act or are still
civil disabilities under the new act. In these areas the new law has
not made any changes. For example, the right to vote32 6 and the
right to hold public office 26 are disabilities under the present statute
and will continue to be disabilities under the new law. The right to
hold, receive, and transfer property has never been affected by the
civil death laws of North Dakota.3 27 Furthermore, "although the im-
prisoned individual under 12-06-27 has never had an affirmative stat-
ute to guarantee his right to contract, it has not been a disability. 28
The inmates have been able to contract for books, magazines and
other items while in prison. Finally, N.D.C.C. 12-06-27 specifically en-
titles the imprisoned inmate to defend -a lawsuit. 29 Thus, despite
the new statutory language it appears that the new statute has
caused a change in only two areas, the right to sues" and the right
to hold offices of private trust in accordance with the law.
Further considerations must be made before the scope of the
new law can be fully considered. The first consideration deals with
the inmate while he is still in prison. The warden of the peniten-
tiary is given general power to make rules and regulations affect-
ing the prisoners. 831 Specifically, he may regulate the conduct of
the prisoners within the penitentiary. Such regulation and prison
management may constitutionally lead to the deterioration of some
of a prisoner's political, personal, or civil rights.3 3 2 The rights of the
prisoners must be considered along with the authority of the prison
officials before the scope of the prisoners rights can adequately be
determined. After parole or discharge, the convicted individual
may still have a difficult time determining the scope of his rights.
Despite the new legislation his rights will be affected in many ways
that do not affect the normal citizen. This is true because the stat-
824. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-27 (1960).
325. N.D. CONST. § 127.
326. See notes 202-06 supra and accompanying text.
327. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-27 (1960).
328. See notes 207-09 supra and accompanying text.
329. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-27 (1960).
The North Dakota Civil Death statute specifically states, "He may be sued and In such
case he may defend."
330. The right to sue is one of the single most important rights examined by this study.
See notes 68-187 supra and accompanying text.
331. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-47-12(8)' (1960).
332. Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) ; The Court stated in dictum that "Lawful
incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and
rights, retraction jJustified by the considerations underlying our penal system."
NoTEs
ute directly exposes itself to the vulnerability of other statutes by
stating "except as otherwise provided by law." This means that des-
pite the new statute, the ex-felon cannot serve as an administrator,
executor or guardian,3 3 3 that he cannot seek employment in a great
number of licensed professions, 3 4 that he cannot depend on his pub-
lic pension when he retires,3 3 5 and that his testimony will be im-
peached because of his criminal record when he tries to testify on
his own behalf or for or against someone else.336 These areas do not
exhaust the potentially disabling statutes. However, they must cer-
tainly raise the question of whether the new legislation, dealing with
the civil disabilities of the convicted individual, accomplish the es-
tablishment of political, personal, and civil rights which the legis-
lature intended.
VI. CONCLUSION
After extensively researching the civil rights of prisoners, the
authors of this paper generally concur with the contents of section
12.1-33-01 and 12.1-33-02. This study, however, has recognized that
many other statutes in the North Dakota Century Code present po-
tential frustration to the rights of any person convicted of a felony.
To prevent such a frustration, the legislature should update the en-
tire body of statutory law to assure that the intention of the new
legislation is not thwarted. Employment is an area of potential frus-
tration. The new legislation guarantees the right to employment,
but present state licensing requirements prevent licensing of past
felons. The difference between these two laws will lead to conflict
and frustration.
While incarcerated the inmate has real and personal property
which should be administered while he is incarcerated. To facilitate
this need the legislature should consider establishing a law whereby
a fiduciary or representative could be appointed by order of the
Court at the request of the prisoner, his spouse, or creditors to ad-
minister the real and personal property of the inmate.
The matter of prisoner's wages while in prison should be recon-
sidered. First, the practice of placing a percentage of each inmate's
wages into the prisoner's general benefit fund should be discontinued,
and the benefit fund should be funded by the legislature as part of
its general appropriation to the prison. Second, interest payments
should be made on prisoner's savings accounts held by prison au-
thorities. Third, a fund should be established from the prison in-
dustry's to pay for work related accidents to inmates.
333. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-11-01(3) (1960).
334. See notes 300-19 sUpra.
335. See notes 291-93 supra.
336. See notes 213-20 supra.
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This study discovered that a five dollar credit paid to county
prisoners is not available to State Farm and Penitentiary prisoners.
To correct this discrepancy, State Farm and Penitentiary prisoners
should be allowed a five dollar credit for labor to be used against
any judgments and fines in the same manner that the credit is al-
lowed for county prisoners under North Dakota Century Code 12-44-33.
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